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LIPTON AND ROWE'S APOLOGIA FOR DELAWARE:
A SHORT REPLY
BY RONALD J. GILsoN'
ABSTRACT
Three themes animate Martin Lipton and Paul Rowe's thoughtful
response to my critical evaluation of Unocal'sfifteen-yearhistory. First,
they maintain that affording shareholders aprimary role in the governance
oftakeovers depends on a commitment to the stock market's informational
efficiency. Second, they claim that allowing shareholders to amend or
repeal a poison pill ignores empirical evidence that the existence of a
poison pill is associated with higher takeover premiums. Third, they assert
that the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) reflects an implicit
mega-principle that assigns control over takeovers to managers. This short
reply corrects Lipton and Rowe's misunderstanding ofthe importance of
market efficiency in assessing the efficiency of a primary role for
shareholders in takeover decision making; suggests that the impact of a
poison pill on takeover premiums depends entirely on what a court will
allow a target company to do with its pill; and,finally, complicates Lipton
and Rowe's argument that the structure of the DGCL implies a primary
takeover role for the board.

I am flattered that Martin Lipton and Paul Rowe have written a
lengthy and thoughtful response' to my reprise of the fifteen-year history

of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.2 Martin Lipton has a strong claim
to having devised the most important innovation in corporate law since
Samuel Dodd invented the trust for John D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil

in 1879.1 Paul Rowe is an active and experienced practitioner who has also
contributed to the debate over Delaware takeover law. Thus, if nothing
*Charles J.Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University, and Marc and
Eva Stem Professor of Law and Business, Columbia University. I appreciate the editors ofthe
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law giving me the opportunity to offer this reply. I am also
grateful to William T. Allen, Jeffrey Gordon, Michael Klausner, and Elliiot Weiss for helpful
comments on an earlier version.
'Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors:A Reply to Professor
Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2002.
'Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later(And What We Can DoAbout It), 26 DEL.
J.CORP. L. 491 (2001); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
3

See RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 224-25 (1998).

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 27

else, it is an enormous, if perhaps somewhat backhanded, compliment4 that
they thought my essay had sufficient potential for influence to warrant their
substantial effort to challenge it.
To set the stage for purposes of this short reply, my essay offered a
respectful, but in the end negative, assessment of the Delaware Supreme
Court's post- Unocal effort to walk a middle road between managerialists,
like Mr. Lipton, who thought defensive tactics in tender offers were
properly reviewed under the business judgment rule, and those, mainly
academics, who thought that the ultimate decision concerning a tender offer
belonged to the shareholders. This middle road-the Unocal intermediate
standard-contemplated a regulatory role for the courts in that they
themselves would determine whether a particular defensive tactic was
reasonable in relation to the threat, if any, posed by the offer. In "Unocal
Fifteen Years Later," I argued that the supreme court's subsequent
development of the intermediate standard, culminating in Unitrin,s has
devolved into an unexplained preference that control contests be resolved
through an election rather than the market. Unless a successful proxy fight
by the bidder to remove the incumbent board "would either be
mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable,"6 it appears that the
board may decline to redeem a poison pill, thereby preventing shareholders
from having the opportunity to accept a tender offer. I suggested that the
court's path was set by a well meant, but, with the benefit of hindsight,
plainly incorrect concern that the hostile takeovers represented a
macroeconomic threat, and that, correctly in this respect, only the Delaware
courts were in a position to act.
Fifteen years of experience, as exemplified by Unitrin'sunexplained
electoral bias, counsels in favor of repositioning Delaware takeover law for
the future. To that end, I offered a modest proposal. I did not suggest
overturning Moran v. Household International,Inc.'s' validation of a

board's power to adopt a poison pill, nor did I suggest that the Delaware
Supreme Court recant its post-Unocal doctrine. Rather, I recommended
only that shareholders be allowed to amend or repeal an existing poison pill
by adopting a bylaw to that effect.
Lipton and Rowe rather exaggerate the impact of this proposal. "If
stockholders can tell the board that directors' fiduciary duties do not allow

'IThe tone of my response will reflect that compliment and largely (but not completely)
ignore the
hyperbole that from time to time appears in the Lipton & Rowe essay.
5
Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
61d. at 1388-89.
"500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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for adoption of a pill," Lipton and Rowe inform us, "then there are no
teachings left of Unocal,Household,and Quickturn [DesignSystems, Inc.
v. Shapiro]."' For better or worse, however, sanctioning a shareholderadopted bylaw to amend or redeem a pill hardly puts Humpty Dumpty back
together again. Repealing Household Internationalwould require the
board to secure shareholder approval before adopting a pill. My modest
proposal leaves board adopted pills (and the supreme court's unfortunate
post- Unocaljurisprudence) in place, except in those circumstances when
shareholders overcome the substantial costs of defeating management in a
proxy contest over adopting the redeeming bylaw. This hardly merits
Lipton and Rowe's characterization of it as the "wholesale rejection of the
framework of Delaware law regarding takeovers." 9
But whether my proposal is modest or downright subversive, Lipton
and Rowe certainly offer a different view of the doctrinal history, and a
rather different assessment of the role of takeovers in corporate
governance. Quite plainly, they have sought to offer the reasoned analysis
of how the Delaware Supreme Court got to its holding in Unitrinthat the
court has not itself provided. Readers can assess our competing accounts
of Delaware takeover doctrine without further assistance from any of the
authors.
What does warrant further comment, however, are three themes that
animate Lipton and Rowe's argument. The first is that affording
shareholders a primary role in the governance of takeovers depends on an
unequivocal commitment to the stock market's informational efficiency.
The second is that allowing shareholders to repeal a poison pill ignores
empirical evidence showing that the adoption of a pill increases takeover
premiums. The third is that the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL), although silent with respect to target directors' power to block
offers not directed to them, nonetheless incorporates an unstated metaprinciple that privileges directors over shareholders with respect to all

forms of takeovers. Part I of this reply addresses Lipton and Rowe's
misunderstanding of the importance of market efficiency in assessing the
shareholders' role in the governance of takeovers. Part II takes up the
poison pill issue, suggesting that the pill is itself an empty vessel whose
impact, transactionally and on share prices, depends on what standard
governs its redemption. Finally, Part III complicates Lipton and Rowe's

'Lipton & Rowe, supranote 1,at 3 (adding citation-Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro,
721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998)).
9Id. at 2.
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neat construction of the DGCL as reflecting an unstated meta-principle that
allocates control over takeovers to management.
I. MARKET EFFICIENCY AND THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
OF TAKEOVERS
The most puzzling aspect of Lipton and Rowe's criticism of my
assessment of Delaware takeover law is their sharp focus on market
efficiency. This concept, in their view, seems to separate the forces of
darkness and light: "[o]n the one side are the partisans of the efficient
market theory.... On the other side are a variety of other participants in
the debate who do not accept the efficient market theory as the only, or the
best, guide for corporate law decision making.""0 Lipton and Rowe then
complete their syllogism by arguing that efficient market theory has been
discredited of late and, therefore, so too has the position of those who view
shareholders as the ultimate decision makers in tender offers. The problem
with this neat two-step is that it misstates the role of market efficiency in
the analysis and also misstates or misunderstands the impact of recent
criticism of market efficiency on the corporate governance role of
takeovers.
The role of takeovers in corporate governance is by now a familiar
story. Some forms of corporate underperformance may prove difficult to
remedy internally. The product market often does not act with sufficient
speed or intensity to police poor strategy or implementation. As well, the
need for industry-wide restructuring-as, for example with the failure of
the conglomerate experiment-may be difficult to perceive from within the
industry and the corporation. Under these circumstances, traditional legal
rules are ill suited to resolve concerns about these kinds of
underperformance. Courts cannot distinguish with precision whether
underperformance results from bad luck on the one hand, or bad judgment
on the other. The business judgment rule properly serves to allocate that
assessment to the market." If underperformance persists, the value gap
may come to exceed the costs of mounting a hostile tender offer. The issue
of defensive tactics arises in this context. Target management's efforts to
block a takeover may reflect a good faith effort to secure a better price for
'Old. at 2-3. Elsewhere, Lipton and Rowe identify "the primacy ofthe outcomes defined
as optimal by the efficient market theory" as one of the "false premises" underlying my theses.
Id. at 19.

"This analysis is developed in Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819

(1981).
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shareholders, or it may reflect entrenchment-a preference of target
management to maintain the status quo.
So far, we only have an agency problem. Market efficiency now
comes into play in two different ways. First, one might take the position
that the target company's current market price is a sufficiently good
measure of the company's value that even a very small premium is an
advantage to target shareholders. In this view, advanced originally by
Judge (then Professor) Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel, one
could argue that target management should be entirely passive in the face
of a hostile tender offer, fore-going even an effort to secure a better price.'2
From the perspective of target company shareholders, this argument places
significant reliance on the target company's stock price as an accurate
measure of value because the attractiveness of a small premium is sensitive
to small differences in underlying value.
The other position is that target management should be permitted to
deploy defensive tactics to provide sufficient time to secure a better offer
or to persuade shareholders that remaining independent would result in
greater long-term value. This position recognizes that share prices may not
reflect information about the company known only within the corporation,
and that target management can enhance the corporation's share price by
disclosing that information. It further recognizes that management can use
delay to negotiate a higher price for shareholders or to attract a competing
bid. In the end, however, shareholders decide whether to accept the offer. is
This position is significantly less dependent on the relative degree of
market efficiency, because the process of seeking an alternative offer and
informing shareholders of previously private information will improve the
market's pricing. I should also note a point to which I will return shortly.
This position is not inconsistent with Mr. Lipton's poison pill. 4 Indeed, the
12Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole ofa Target'sManagement
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
"SSee, e.g., Gilson, supranote 11. The Interco standard reflects a similar allocation of
roles. The difference between these two positions is substantial--can target managers seek to
increase value for shareholders or must they be completely passive? It generated a long running
argument between Easterbrook & Fishel and Alan Schwartz, on the side of passivity, and myself
and Lucian Bebchuk on the side of active but non-defensive target management activity. For a
sense of the debate, compare Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12; Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1982): Alan
Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORo. 229 (1986), with

Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35
STAN. L. REv. 51 (1982); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Casefor FacilitatingCompeting Tender
Offers, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1028 (1982); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Casefor FacilitatingCompeting
Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982).
"'Lipton and Rowe complain about the labeling of Lipton's innovation with the term
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pill is an effective way of securing sufficient time for management to seek

out an alternative bid or communicate with shareholders. The position is
only inconsistent with Mr. Lipton's preferred construction of the pill-that
the pill allows blocking the shareholders from ever having the opportunity

to accept the offer.
This is the point where agency theory and market efficiency
intersect. Management may have nonpublic information concerning the
value of the corporation that convinces them that the tender offer price is
too low. Nothing in efficient market theory is inconsistent with this
circumstance. The shareholder choice position does not depend on the
stock market being strong form efficient, i.e., that share prices reflect
information that only management knows.
That leaves us with a balance. On the one hand, as Lipton and Rowe
want to emphasize, management may know something that the market does
not. On the other, as they are inclined to ignore, management may be
resisting the tender offer out of either self-interest or error. How do we
trade off the absence of strong form market efficiency-the reason for
giving management discretion-and the potential for agency costs, the
reason for restraining discretion? The shareholder choice position gives
target management the opportunity to reduce the informational inefficiency
by seeking alternatives and by disclosing information. Lipton and Rowe's
position ignores the agency cost problem and does nothing about the
claimed mispricing of a target company's stock.
Neither Lipton and Rowe's position nor my shareholder choice
position perfectly solves both problems. Target management may be
correct that long-term value is maximized by independence even though it
cannot credibly demonstrate it. Alternatively, shareholders may be better
off accepting the offer because management's opposition is a mistake or is
self-interested. So, how do we choose the best rule for target shareholders?
The question can be posed empirically. Take two samples: one
composed of companies that successfully defeated hostile tender offers and
remain independent; the second composed of companies that either are
taken over by the initial bidder or have secured a better offer. Lipton and
Rowe's manageralist position is supported if returns to shareholders of the
"remain independent" sample exceed those of the "taken over" sample.

"poison pill." They prefer "Shareholders' Rights Plan." It is hard to see how this label is more
descriptive, especially since the thrust of their position in this debate is that shareholders should
not have the "right" to forgo a shareholders' rights plan. See Ronald J. Gilson, Just Say No to
Whom?, 25 WAKE FORESTL. REV. 121 (1990).
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Alternatively, the shareholder choice position is supported if returns to
shareholders of the "taken over" sample are higher.
Lipton and Rowe should find this framing of the issue familiar. In
Lipton's 1979 article, he undertook a similar empirical test, announcing that
a quasi-"remain independent" sample experienced greater returns: "more
than 50 percent of the targets are either today at a higher market price than
the rejected offer price or were acquired after the tender offer was defeated
by another company at a price higher than the offer price."" The problem
was that Lipton's sample included companies that were subsequently
acquired at a higher price not long after blocking the hostile offer-an
outcome entirely consistent with a shareholder choice regime. If instead
the focus is on the subsequent share values of only those companies in
Lipton's sample that remained independent, his data reveals a different
result. Target shareholders who held on to their shares as a result of
management preventing them from tendering in the hostile offer earned an
average compounded rate ofreturn on the money they would have received
had they been allowed to tender of negative 5.48 percent. This is hardly a
testimonial to the value of target management's private information. 6
A more recent example ofthis same phenomenon is set out in Figure
One (although it is only one data point, it is a familiar one)-the impact on
Time Inc.'s shareholders after the company's ability to stay independent as
a result ofthe Delaware Supreme Court decision that Paul Rowe described
as "a promise to corporate America." 7 Figure One compares actual posttransaction returns to Time's shareholders with the returns they would have
received if they had been allowed to accept Paramount's $200 per share
offer and invested the proceeds in either the less risky New York Stock
Exchange index or in a debt instrument paying ten percent. It took eleven
years for Time's shareholders to break even for the first time, although this
condition did not last. Time's shareholders were not wrong in preferring
the Paramount offer.

sMartin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 106
(1979).

' 6Gilson, supra note !1.
"Paul K. Rowe, The Future ofthe "Friendly Deal" in Delaware (2001) (manuscript on
file with author).
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Figure One: TIME WARNER ADJUSTED STOCKPRICE
Jan. 4, 1988 - Jan. 11, 2001
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This analysis suggests that agency cost problems in takeovers are
more serious than problems of strong form market inefficiency. This is
hardly surprising considering that a shareholder choice approach limits the
extent of market inefficiency, while the Lipton and Rowe does nothing to
alleviate the agency cost problem."8

"8Of course, it need not have worked out that way. If one makes strong enough
assumptions, any result is possible. For example, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny recently
offered a model in which takeover activity in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s can be explained by
market inefficiency. The model, however, has some Rube Goldberg-like characteristics. First, the
stock market is assumed to be dramatically inefficient-either badly over or undervaluing a
company's stock-while managers are assumed to be completely rational and understand precisely
the way in which the market is inefficient and are also able to predict precisely the long-term value
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There is no need to go into detail in responding to Lipton and Rowe's
misstatement of the empirical evidence on takeovers. For present purposes
it is sufficient to note that the most recent and extensive empirical
investigation, which takes into account the econometric lessons learned from

earlier studies, supports the proposition that takeovers result in net
shareholder gains, with the lion's share of the gain going to target
shareholders. I am not aware of any study that shows other than large
positive gains for target shareholders from takeovers.' 9

I will pause, however, to question Lipton and Rowe's claim that recent
economic challenges to the concept of market efficiency, namely that
anomalies such as the January effect, events like the October 1987 market
crash, and developments in behavioral economics, render market efficiency
an unreliable basis for takeover policy. First, Lipton and Rowe's
presentation of this material is strikingly unbalanced.2" More important,
however, is their reliance on behavioral economics to undermine the
relevance ofmarket efficiency. While Lipton and Rowe point to applications
that predict circumstances where the aggregation mechanisms that drive
market efficiency may fail, they ignore the fact that the role of shareholders
in the governance oftakeovers is a trade-off between agency costs and strong
form market inefficiency. To evaluate the impact of behavioral economics
on this tradeoff requires that we consider its impact on the level of agency
costs as well.
Behavioral economics finds its roots in biases identified by cognitive
psychologists, especially Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. 2" These

of their companies and the companies they purchase. Next, managers are assumed to maximize
their personal objectives given their own time horizons. In effect, the model requires both market
inefficiency and enormous agency costs. The result is acquisitions that have no economic purpose
other than exploiting the particular mispricing of the moment given the self-interest of managers.
ANDREI SHLEmrR & ROBERT W. VISHNY, STocK MARKET DRIVEN ACQUISITIONS (Natl Bureau of

Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8439, 2001).
19
Gregory Andrade et al., NewEvidence andPerspecttvesonMergers, 15 J.ECON. PERSP.
103(2001). Lipton and Rowe get a little carried away with their effort to debunk empirical studies
supporting shareholder gains from takeovers. They characterize the empirical evidence supporting
gains to target shareholders as "weak and inconsistent." Lipton & Rowe, supra note 1, at 21.
Here, Lipton and Rowe simply misstate the facts.
2I take some pride in Lipton and Rowe's repeated reference to my discussion of the limits
to existing empirical studies of market efficiency. The point is that the evidence on any complex
economic phenomenon will be mixed and require analysis. It would have been better had they
exhibited similar balance. For an accessible and skeptical discussion of the persuasiveness of
recent research on market efficiency, including especially the October 1987 crash and behavioral
economics, see Mark Rubinstein, RationalMarkets: Yes or No? The Affirmative Case, 57 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 15 (2001).
2See, e.g., JUDGMENTS UNDER UNCERTANTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman

et al. eds., 1982).
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biases are rooted in failures in individual, not market, decision making, and
thus apply more directly to the decision processes of management. For
example, suppose we apply cognitive dissonance theory to target
management's reaction to a hostile bid which questions management's
performance. This suggests that target managers would reduce the
dissonance they experience as a result of the hostile bid and its explicit
criticism of their performance by deriding the bidders' motives and skills,
and acclaiming the bright future under current leadership. While target
management might in good faith believe its comments, behavioral
economics suggests that the comments grow out of a cognitive bias.
Behavioral economics may in some circumstances predict that the
stock market may fail to regress out inaccurate beliefs, but it also predicts
dysfunctional defensive behavior by target management in takeovers based
on cognitive biases, and in this setting without market aggregation
mechanisms to temper them. In the end, behavioral economics speaks to
both sides of the trade-off between agency costs and market inefficiency.
The necessary judgment remains the same: which failing is systematically
worse? My judgment is that behavioral economics will increase the agency
cost problem more than it will the strong form market inefficiency
problem, reinforcing the shareholder choice position. However, Lipton and
Rowe never consider this issue.
II. THE VALUE OF THE POISON PILL

Not surprisingly given Martin Lipton's role as alchemist behind the
poison pill, Lipton and Rowe take issue with my proposal that shareholders
be allowed to adopt bylaws that amend or repeal board adopted poison

pills. They refer to John Coates' careful evaluation of event studies of pill
adoptions,' and to a number of studies showing that target companies with
a poison pill receive higher premiums than target companies without one.

Both of these references are said to show that the adoption of a company
does not reduce shareholder value.
John Coates' work levels an important criticism of event studies that
try to measure the impact on share price of a company's adoption of a
poison pill. Coates' point is that because the board of directors can adopt
a pill at any time, the company's stock price will already incorporate the
pill's expected impact. The actual adoption is therefore not an event.

"John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critiqueof the
Scientific Evidence, 79 Tsx. L. REV. 271 (2000); John C. Coates IV, EmpiricalEvidence on
StructuralTakeover Defenses: Where Do We Stand?, 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 783 (2000).
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Coates' insight, however, says nothing about whether the pill's impact is
beneficial to target shareholders; it speaks only to the unreliability of using
event studies of the pill's formal adoption to assess its benefit.
The premium studies make a stronger claim-that pills are beneficial
to target shareholders because they increase the size of takeover premia.
With respect to assessment of this data, the critical fact is that a poison pill
is not self-defining. The substance of a pill depends entirely on what the
courts allow management to do with it. Suppose a pill only allows
management time to secure an alternative transaction and persuade
shareholders that the bid price is too low, but does not allow management
ultimately to block the offer-call it an Interco pill. The effect of such a
pill, then, is to allow management the time to seek a higher bidder. In turn,
the premium studies suggest that auctions provide a benefit to target
shareholders, an outcome that is precisely what is predicted by the
shareholder choice model. If this is what a pill means, as I suggested
earlier, it is a useful mechanism to implement a shareholder choice regime,
and Lipton, Rowe, and I have no quarrel (although we all may have a
quarrel with Easterbrook, Fischel, and Schwartz).
Of course, Lipton and Rowe have a very different view of how target
management should be able to use a poison pill. In their view, I assume,
management can decline to redeem a pill-to just say no-provided they
"show through detailed presentations and expert testimony that their
'assertion' was reasonable and based on appropriate information."' Unitrin
put the matter somewhat differently. A pill does not need to be redeemed
if the refusal is not preclusive; that is, as long as a proxy fight is not
'
"mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable."24
The real problem in assessing the impact of the poison pill is framing
a clear hypothesis concerning what a pill can accomplish. If companies in
fact are adopting Interco pills, one result can be expected. If companies are
adopting the Lipton and Rowe "just say no" pills, a different result is
expected. Finally, if the substance of pills changes over time because of
judicial decisions, and if uncertainty remains over the substance of a pill
fifteen years after HouseholdInternationalbecause the Delaware Supreme
Court has declined to clearly state what a pill authorizes management to do,
then there is no idea what to expect. The outcome would depend on the

'Lipton & Rowe, supra note 1,at 31-32. While it would be refreshing for Lipton and
Rowe to acknowledge that such a showing was necessary, the reality is that the showing sets a
low bar provided that the target company has competent counsel and is actually acting in good
faith. Of course, it is possible to trip over even a low bar, as demonstrated by Vice Chancellor
Strine's careful opinion in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000).
24
Unitrin. 651 A.2d at 1388-89.
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chronological distribution of the sample and on the degree of uncertainty
at any point in time. Any result would necessarily reflect a mix of all these
factors, and therefore reveal little about the impact of pill adoption.
Without being able to specify the substance of the pills making up the
samples of the premium studies, they tell us little about whether a
particular version of a poison pill is a good thing or a bad thing for shareholders.25
What does this analysis add to the debate about shareholder choice
and shareholder adopted bylaws? I think it reveals what Lipton and Rowe
expect shareholders will do if they have the opportunity to act. As I
explained in "Unocal Fifteen Years Later," institutional investors will
approve sensibly drafted, for example, Interco style, pills and may even
approve not so sensibly drafted pills proposed by trusted, well-performing
management. I also believe, and the vigor of Lipton and Rowe's response
suggests they share this belief, that institutional investors will resist pills
that give unimpressive management the power to block a tender offer.
Since that position seems perfectly sensible behavior by rational investors,
why do Lipton and Rowe object to it? The answer, I think, is a
managerialist view of corporate governance that is out of the mainstream;
but, of course, they make the very same claim with respect to my views.
In the end, the debate comes back to where it started some twenty
years ago-to the allocation of responsibility among shareholders and
directors. This brings me to the final point of this response: Lipton and
Rowe's claim of a managerialist meta-principle in Delaware corporate law.
II. LIPTON AND RowE's MANAGERIALIST META-PRINCIPLE
Lipton and Rowe ultimately transcend their attack on market
efficiency and their rigorous defense of the poison pill and thoughtfully
confront a serious question: just how managerialist is the DGCL? Whether
one views their analysis as a careful apologia for what the Delaware
Supreme Court has done but not articulated, or as a road map for what they
hope the Delaware Supreme Court will do, this is the right question to ask.
What makes the analysis difficult is the same issue that made it
difficult when Lipton wrote on this issue in 1979 and when I responded two
years later. The DGCL requires board approval of mergers and sales of
assets, thereby giving the board blocking power. The statute was, and
remains, silent about tender offers because a tender offer does not require

"Bernard Black and I made this point sometime ago in RONALD J. GiLSON & BERNARD
S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQutsmoNs (2d ed. 1995).
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corporate level action. Lipton in 1979, and now with Rowe, fill that
supposed gap by arguing that a tender offer has the same functional effect
as other fundamental transactions and therefore should be treated the same
way: directors should be able to block a tender offer that they do not
approve. As I suggested in "Unocal Fifteen Years Later," this is a strange
argument for the court that invented the equal dignity doctrine to
rationalize different processes for functionally similar acquisition
techniques. The statute's silence with respect to tender offers, now many
years after their emergence, simply dictates a different process for tender
offers. In 1981, and now, I argue that tender offers provide a critical
safeguard that supports board control over every other acquisition
technique (and the protection of the business judgment rule). If the board
improperly or mistakenly declines an acquisition offer, the shareholders
can go over their heads by accepting a tender offer. In this analysis, tender
offers are treated differently precisely because they are the functional
equivalent of a merger or sale of assets.
Here, then, is where the issue is joined. In Lipton and Rowe's view,
the role of safety valve that I ascribe to tender offers, they ascribe to
elections: 'Shareholder choice' is exercised in elections for corporate
directors."'2 We then confront the comparative advantage of markets and
elections at resolving control contests, which I addressed in "Unocal
Fifteen Years Later."
For present purposes, I will not rehearse the differences in statutory
analysis that both sides to this debate offer to support their positions.
While I think Lipton and Rowe significantly overstate the coherence of the
Delaware statute in this regard and the structural exegesis that has been
offered by the Delaware courts, readers can judge the persuasiveness of the
competing analyses without further assistance from the participants.
Rather, I want to finish by briefly exploring how pervasive Lipton and
Rowe's managerialism is. I suggest that their commitment to elections runs
less deep than they acknowledge, and that their position ends up
threatening the legitimacy of the very system that they (and I) seek to
support.
In "UnocalFifteen Years Later," I argued that a critical problem with
elections serving as the only safety valve in the system is that defensive
pressure then shifts to elections, and degrades the election process itself.
We have already seen the progression begin-target management is no less
threatened by an election whose campaign theme is to pull the pill than by
the tender offer itself-so that the dynamic we have already observed with
26
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defensive tactics is repeated with elections. Counsel devises dead hand and
slow hand pills, recommends staggered boards, and formulates tactics, such
as eliminating the right of shareholders to call special meetings, and
delaying shareholder meetings, which have the unnistaken purpose of
shifting the outcome of the election to favor management, irrespective of
the merits.
With the welcome exception of Mentor Graphic'sdispatch of dead
and slow hand pills, the courts have not really policed this process. Lipton
and Rowe refer to Chancellor Allen's strict formulation in Blasius-thatthe
"board bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification
for such [franchise-impairing] action"27-- as a bulwark against managerial
electoral manipulation. It is unclear, however, whether this standard has
survived. It seems difficult to rationalize Blasius' requirement that the
board demonstrate a compelling justification for manipulating the election
process with the Delaware Supreme Court's tepid direction on remand in
Unitrin that the chancery court determine only whether the target board's
machinations have made a proxy contest "mathematically impossible or

realistically unattainable."
Similarly, Vice Chancellor Jacobs' inability to impose limits on
board delay of a shareholder called meeting in Mentor Graphicsprovides
further evidence of the difficulty of ensuring the evenhandedness of the
electoral process against the weight of determined defensive tactics.

Despite the Vice Chancellor's obvious recognition of the potential for
abuse, the opinion provides no constraints beyond urging counsel to
exercise caution and restraint.28 As I said in "Unocal Fifteen Years Later,"
"It is difficult to imagine an electoral process that can both confer
legitimacy on the victor and still leave the incumbent very substantial
discretion to manipulate the process."" There I referred to the first
Peruvian presidential election seeking to displace Alberto Fujimoro as
providing an example of the corrosive power of scheduling on the
legitimacy of elections.
This debate matters because the genius of the American corporate
system over the last twenty years has been its ability to quickly adapt to
changing economic conditions, assisted in major respects by the ability of
those outside the corporation to impose change through the mechanism of

2

11d. at 32 n.130 (quoting Blasts Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch.

1988)).

2

Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., 728 A.2d 25, 45 (Del. Ch. 1998).
Gilson, supra note 2, at 506.
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29

2002]

LIPTON AND ROWE'S APOLOGIA

the market for corporate control.3" In the early 1990s, a number of critics,
including importantly Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter
and Mr. Lipton, compared the U.S. capital market unfavorably to those of
Germany and Japan, because of the operation of the market for corporate
control.3 Fifteen years later, the U.S. economy has changed rapidly,
reallocating resources by downsizing in some industries and increasing
resources devoted to others, accomplished in important respects through
the operation of the market for corporate control and through restructurings
voluntarily initiated in anticipation of that market. Reflecting this success,
international corporate governance reform has followed an explicitly nonmanagerialist version of the U.S. corporate governance system rather than
the much more managerialist systems of Germany and Japan. For example,
U.S. style governance reform was an important part of the World Bank's
and IMF's response to the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis. In the
meantime, Japan remains frozen with a corporate governance system that
is impervious to external change despite a decade long recession, and the
European Union seeks persistently (although with mixed success) to more
fully open European corporate governance to external influence. 2
Lipton and Rowe's response to this concern, I take it, would be that
the poison pill and the increasingly managerial bent of Delaware law,
exemplified by Unitrin,did not interfere with the remarkable restructuring
process the U.S. experienced. But here, however, Lipton and Rowe cannot
have it both ways. Lipton and Rowe may be right that the pill did not
present a serious barrier because, in the end, the issue of what management
could do with the pill was resolved in the market. The views of the
institutional investment community made it unlikely that a company
ultimately could block shareholders from deciding whether to accept an
offer even if the courts might have allowed it. In effect, Lipton and Rowe's
point is that the marketplace turned Mr. Lipton's pill into an Interco pill.
But if that is right, then all that saved the pill from having a negative
economic impact is that it did not function as Lipton and Rowe would have
3
See, e.g., Ronald J.Gilson, CorporateGovernance and Economic Efficiency: When
Do InstitutionsMatter, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327 (1996); Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology
ofTakeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizingthe EuropeanCorporateGovernanceEnvironment, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 161 (1992).
31
Michael E. Porter, CapitalDisadvantage: America's Failing CapitalInvestment
System, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept./Oct. 1992, at 65.
32
The Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to
Takeover Bids (Jan. 20, 2002), which was commissioned by the European Commission
following the European Parliament's surprising rejection by a tie vote of the Proposed Thirteenth
Directive on takeovers, recommends a new takeover regime that largely embraces the principle
of shareholder choice.
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liked. And, in that event, it would be helpful if the courts (and Lipton and
Rowe) acknowledged that there is no "justsay no" defense to tender offers.
It has been more than fifteen years since Unocal, and clarity is long
overdue.
That leaves us with the problem of repositioning Delaware law with
the assumption that the Delaware Supreme Court will prove characteristically reluctant to reconsider its doctrinal construct.33 Allowing shareholders,
by initiating bylaws, a hand in assuring that the design of a poison pill
actually benefits them, is a workable, if only partial solution that finds its
support in the language ofthe DGCL and in the Delaware Supreme Court's
penchant for according each statutory provision equal dignity. It would
also take the pressure off of the electoral process and eliminate the
embarrassing spectacle of directors manipulating their own election.

33In a remarkable recent article, the former Chancellor and two sitting Vice Chancellors
set out an extra judicial road map for how the Delaware Supreme Court might usefully
uncomplicate its takeover doctrine. William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A
Reassessment ofStandardsofReview in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 1287 (2001).
While their proposals are quite moderate, the Delaware Supreme Court has evidenced no
inclination to follow their advice. See A. Gilbert Sparks & Patricia R. Uhlenbrock, Progress
Update: Delaware's Common Law Simpijflcation Initiative (Jan. 2002) (manuscript on file with
author).

